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The Final Frontier: Are Class Action Waivers in Broker-Dealer 
Employment Agreements Enforceable? 
 





Many broker-dealers (securities brokerage firms)1 require their 
employees, also known as “associated persons,”2 to sign employment 
agreements as a condition of employment. Often those employment 
agreements include a provision mandating arbitration of any employment 
disputes that may arise.3 Under the Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation 
of section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”),4 there is little doubt that 
 
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Elisabeth Haub School of Law 
at Pace University. I am grateful to comments I received at the February 12, 2020, Penn State 
Arbitration Law Review Symposium, “Collective Bargaining and Adhesive Arbitration.” I 
also am grateful for the research assistance of Diana Balaj, Haub Law, J.D. Class of 2022. 
 
1 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) defines “broker” as “any person 
engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others.” 
Exchange Act, § 3(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (2018). The Exchange Act defines a "dealer" 
as “any person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own account, 
through a broker or otherwise....” Exchange Act, § 3(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5). Since most 
industry firms act as both brokers and dealers, they are commonly referred to as “broker-
dealers.” 
 
2 The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), the primary self-regulatory 
organization (“SRO”) in the securities industry,  designates individual brokers employed or 
controlled by a broker-dealer firm as “associated persons.” FINRA MANUAL, Rule 1011(b), 
https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules (last visited July 2, 2020). 
 
3 See JAMES A. FANTO, JILL GROSS & NORMAN POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND 
REGULATION § 21.01, at 21-3 (5th ed. 2018 & supp. 2020). Even absent an arbitration clause 
in an employment agreement, employment disputes between an associated person and a 
FINRA member firm must be arbitrated under FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for 
Industry Disputes (“Industry Code”), Rule 13200(a). 
 
4 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). That section provides: 
 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such 
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an 
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such 
a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
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those adhesive pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate are enforceable, even for 
claims arising under federal statutes.5 
Some of these employment contracts also include within the pre-dispute 
arbitration agreement additional language known as a “class action waiver.”6 
Pursuant to a typical class action waiver clause, parties agree not only to 
arbitrate all disputes arising out of the contractual relationship, but, as part of 
that agreement, they agree to waive their right to bring those claims on a 
 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 
 
The Court has written that section 2 reflects “an emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral 
dispute resolution” (Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 533 (2012) 
(quoting KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 565 U.S. 18, 21 (2011) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)) and a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.” Moses H. Cone 
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). Thus, through section 2, Congress 
expressed a policy preference for both the process of arbitration and the contract to use the 
process (the arbitration agreement). 
 
5 See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1621 (2018) (reiterating that the FAA 
“requires courts ‘rigorously’ to ‘enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms’”); 
see also 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 274 (2009) (holding that “collective-
bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate 
ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law”); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (holding that claims arising under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act are arbitrable). Additionally, in December 2019, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission rescinded its 1997 policy statement that opposed mandatory 
arbitration of employment discrimination claims. See Equal Opportunity Empl. Comm., 
RECISSION OF MANDATORY BINDING ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
DISPUTES AS A CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT, https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/recission-
mandatory-binding-arbitration-employment-discrimination-disputes-condition (last visited 
June 29, 2020). 
 
6 For example, as a condition of their employment with the company, Credit Suisse requires 
its financial advisers to agree to an arbitration agreement within a document called the 
Employment Dispute Resolution Program (“EDRP”). The EDRP specifies individual 
binding arbitration as the only procedure for resolving disputes that cannot be resolved by 
agreement, and states that “no dispute subject to arbitration under this section shall be 
consolidated with any other employee’s dispute or prosecuted as a class or collective 
action…An employee’s agreement to abide by the terms of the [EDRP] includes an 
agreement not to serve as a class representative or class member or act as a private attorney 
general in any dispute with Credit Suisse.” See Laver v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA), LLC, No. 
18-CV-00828-WHO, 2018 WL 3068109, at *7-10 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2018), aff’d, 976 F.3d 
841 (9th Cir. 2020). Other broker-dealers that have included class action waivers in their 
employment agreements include UBS Financial Services, Ameriprise Financial Services, 
and Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. See Lewis v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc., 818 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 
1166 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (enforcing class waiver); Dauod v. Ameriprise Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 
8:10-CV-00302-CJC, 2011 WL 6961586, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2011); Banus v. Citigroup 
Glob. Markets, Inc., No. 09 CIV. 7128 (LAK), 2010 WL 1643780, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 




representative basis, including as a member of a class or collective action. 
Instead, parties agree that any covered dispute would have to be brought 
individually in arbitration.7 The Court enforces these waivers as an agreed-
upon term in the arbitration clause specifying “the rules under which that 
arbitration will be conducted.”8  
To date, the Supreme Court has not seen a class action waiver it has not 
liked or enforced.9 In 2011, it held that the FAA preempted a California 
judge-made law that voided consumer class action waivers as unconscionable 
because that state law conflicted with the purposes of the FAA. Rather, the 
FAA mandated enforcement of the waiver. 10 In 2013, the Court ruled that a 
class action waiver in merchants’ arbitration agreements with their charge 
card service provider does not deprive them of their ability to vindicate their 
statutory rights, even if the expense of pursuing an antitrust claim on an 
individual basis made it economically unfeasible to pursue.11 Only if an 
 
7 See, e.g., Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 231 (2013) (identifying class 
action waiver language in the arbitration agreement at issue). 
 
8 Id. at 233, 238-39; see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011) 
(enforcing class action waiver). Notably, the Italian Colors Court treated the class action 
waiver provision as a term of the arbitration agreement, not a separate agreement between 
the parties. Indeed, if the Court were to treat the two provisions as separate agreements, then 
FAA section 2 would not cover the class waiver provision at all, as it would not be an 
“agreement to arbitrate.” 
 
9 See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018) (enforcing class action waiver 
in employment agreement); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 466 (2015) 
(preempting under the FAA a California state court’s holding that a class action waiver in an 
arbitration clause was not enforceable under California law); Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 233-
35 (enforcing pre-dispute arbitration clause containing a class action waiver in merchants’ 
credit card processing agreements); AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 352 (holding that FAA 
preempted California law invalidating class action waivers in consumer agreements). On a 
related note, the Court recently held that the FAA does not allow a court to compel class 
arbitration when the agreement does not clearly provide for it. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 
139 S. Ct. 1407, 1416 (2019) (“Like silence, ambiguity does not provide a sufficient basis to 
conclude that parties to an arbitration agreement agreed to [class arbitration]”). 
 
10 AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 352. The Court discussed three characteristics of class 
arbitration that it concluded defeat the purposes of the FAA and hinder the flexible party-
driven process of arbitration: (1) sacrifice of informality and speed; (2) a requisite increase 
in procedural formality; and (3) an increase in risks to defendants in the lack of judicial 
review. Id. at 348-51. 
 
11 Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 234-35. The “effective vindication” doctrine originated from 
dictum in  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628, 
(1985), where the Court “expressed a willingness to invalidate, on ‘public policy’ grounds, 
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arbitration agreement stripped a party of the “right” to sue, as opposed to the 
“ability” to sue would it be unenforceable.12 In 2018, the Court ruled that a 
class and collective action waiver in an employment agreement was 
enforceable, and that the National Labor Relations Act’s language granting 
workers the right to form unions and bargain collectively was not a “contrary 
congressional command” that superseded the FAA’s command to enforce 
arbitration agreements as written and voided the waiver.13 
What about in the securities industry? Neither FINRA’s Industry Code 
nor Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes (“Customer 
Code”)14 permits class or collective claims to be pursued in its forum.15 This 
policy choice is based on a conclusion by the forum and by FINRA’s direct 
regulator, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), that FINRA’s 
arbitration forum is not appropriate to handle and resolve class actions.16 
Instead, securities regulators have made it clear that investors and associated 
persons should have the right to bring class actions in court.17  
Indeed, in a disciplinary proceeding, FINRA’s Board of Governors 
reversed a hearing officer's ruling that a broker-dealer could insert a class 
action waiver in its standard customer arbitration agreement, and any FINRA 
 
arbitration agreements that ‘operat [e] ... as a prospective waiver of a party's right to 
pursue statutory remedies.’” Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 235 (citing Mitsubishi Motors, 473 
U.S. at 637, n. 19 (emphasis added)).  
 
12 Italian Colors, 570 U.S., at 236. Though the Court wrote in Italian Colors that it has 
enforced a class action waiver before (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 
U.S. 20 (1991), as an example), in fact, no class action waiver was at issue in Gilmer. See 
Jill I. Gross, Justice Scalia's Hat Trick and the Supreme Court’s Flawed Understanding of 
Twenty-First Century Arbitration, 81 BROOKLYN L. REV. 111, 134-36 (2015). 
 
13 Epic Systems, 138 S.Ct. at 1624-26. Though the Court has not had an opportunity to 
address the enforeceability of a class action waiver in an arbitration clause arising out of a 
collective bargaining agreement, it is likely that the Court would find that enforceable, too. 
However, a union is unlikely to agree to include a class action waiver in a collective 
bargaining agreement, so the issue may never be ripe for Supreme Court review. See Lise 
Gelertner, 2019 J. DISP. RESOL. 115, 116. 
 
14 FINRA Dispute Resolution Services hears 99% of all securities arbitrations in the country. 
Arbitration & Mediation, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., 
https://www.finra.org/arbitration-mediation (last visited June 27, 2020). It offers separate 
Codes of Arbitration Procedure for disputes between customers and broker-dealers on the 
one hand, and intra-industry disputes on the other. 
 
15 FINRA Rules 12204, 13204. 
 
16 See infra notes 36-42, and accompanying text. 
 




rules to the contrary are preempted by the FAA.18 Instead, FINRA held that 
FINRA's rules mandating that investors be able to bring class claims in court 
were enforceable.19 FINRA’s regulatory policy, however, clashes with the 
FAA’s mandate to enforce arbitration agreements as written, if a broker-
dealer inserts a class waiver in its employment agreements with associated 
persons.  
How would a court resolve a broker-dealer’s action to enforce its class 
action waiver, which would require the court to disregard FINRA Rule 
13204? The Supreme Court has identified one exception to the FAA’s 
mandate: if a “contrary congressional command” displaces the FAA.20 Thus 
far, the Court has not had occasion to examine whether a class action waiver 
in a broker-dealer’s employment agreement with an employee is enforceable 
under this exception. While the Court seems very supportive of these waivers, 
the securities industry is different.21 Securities arbitration is heavily 
regulated, and pronouncements by the SEC—when exercising power 
expressly delegated to it by Congress— make it clear that class actions in 
court should be preserved for both investors and broker-dealer employees.   
This article analyzes this issue and concludes that these class waivers are 
not enforceable. Part II details the regulatory framework in the securities 
industry relevant to this issue. Part III explains why FINRA, as a forum, does 
not accept class actions and why the SEC believes court-filed class actions 
should be preserved for employees of broker-dealers. Part IV describes the 
framework the Supreme Court directs courts to use when analyzing alleged 
conflicts between two Congressional Acts. Part V argues that FINRA’s Rule 
13204 barring FINRA member firms from forcing employees to waive their 
right to pursue class action claims in court conflicts with and supersedes the 
FAA’s general pronouncement to enforce arbitration agreements as written. 
Part VI concludes. 
 
 
18 See Dep't of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., Complaint No. 2011029760201, 
2014 WL 1665738 (FINRA Apr. 24, 2014). 
 
19 Id. at *14-18. Simultaneous with the issuance of the decision, Schwab entered into a Letter 
of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent with FINRA, settling the enforcement action by 
consenting to a $500,000 penalty and agreeing not to appeal the decision further. 
 
20 CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98 (2012) (holding that claims arising 
under federal statutes are arbitrable as a matter of public policy absent a “contrary 
congressional command”) (quoting Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 
226 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
21 See Jill Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?, 30 PACE L. REV. 1174 (2010) 
(arguing that the regulatory scheme in the securities industry differentiates arbitration 
agreements in broker-dealer customer agreements from those in consumer contracts). 
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II. CONGRESS’ STATUTORY DELEGATION TO THE SEC 
 
In the wake of the stock market crash of 1929, Congress passed the 
Exchange Act in 193422 to protect investors from abuses in the capital 
markets.23 In addition to creating the SEC as the primary federal securities 
regulator, the Exchange Act also set up a system of industry self-regulation 
designating national securities exchanges as SROs to further protect investors 
and the public interest.24  
In 1938, Congress amended the Exchange Act to authorize the 
registration of national securities associations as additional SROs to regulate 
brokers in the over-the-counter market.25 Additionally, Congress required all 
broker-dealers that deal with the public (with a few minor exceptions) to be 
a member of a registered national securities association.26 Because FINRA is 
the only registered national securities association under section 15A of the 
Exchange Act, all broker-dealers are FINRA member firms.27 
In 1975, Congress again amended the Exchange Act, this time to give the 
SEC broad new powers over all SROs, including the power to review and 
approve all of their proposed rules and to require them to adopt, change, or 
repeal any rules if deemed necessary.28 Through this power, the SEC 
exercises oversight of FINRA’s activities, including operation of its 
arbitration forum. The Exchange Act requires FINRA to adopt rules that may 
be designed for a variety of purposes, ranging from preventing “fraudulent 
and manipulative acts and practices” to promoting “just and equitable 
principles of trade,” and “in general, [protecting] investors and the public 
 
22 Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–
78pp (2018)). 
 
23 See JAMES A. FANTO, JILL GROSS & NORMAN POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND 
REGULATION § 1.01, at 1-3 (5th ed. 2018 & Supp. 2020) (explaining that the broker-dealer 
“industry is highly regulated because of its economic importance” and the “possibility of 
investor abuse”). 
 
24 See id. § 4.01, at 4-3, 4-4. 
 
25 See id. § 4.01[C], at 4-9. 
 
26 See Exchange Act § 15(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8). 
 
27 See Exchange Act § 15(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(1). 
 
28 Exchange Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 78s. Specifically, Congress mandated that the SEC review 
and release for public comment “any proposed rule or any proposed change in, addition to, 
or deletion from the rules of such self-regulatory organization.” See Exchange Act § 19(b)(1), 




interest.”29 FINRA must file proposed rule changes with the SEC, and, before 
approving them, the SEC must publish notice and provide interested persons 
an opportunity to comment on the proposals.30  
Like it has in other industries,31 in the securities industry Congress created 
an administrative agency—the SEC—and empowered it to be the expert 
decision-maker regarding regulation in the securities industry. Indeed, as 
recently as 2010, in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010,32 Congress reaffirmed the long-held view that 
regulation of arbitration in the securities industry was best left to the SEC—
the administrative agency with the most relevant expertise and a long history 
of regulating the process, rather than Congress itself.33 The next section 
discusses how the SEC invoked its expertise and implemented the policies of 
the Exchange Act and purposes of Congress when regulating FINRA’s 
arbitration forum. 
 
III. FINRA DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND CLASS ACTIONS 
 
The securities industry has used arbitration to resolve intra-industry 
disputes since the founding of the New York Stock Exchange in the early 
1800s.34 FINRA and its predecessor, the National Association of Securities 
 
29 Exchange Act § 15A(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6). The statute also lists certain improper 
purposes, including regulating “matters not related to the purposes of [the Act].” Id. 
 
30 Id. § 19(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1). Conversely, the SEC must disapprove a proposed 
rule change if it does not make the requisite finding. Id. § 19(b)(2)(C)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 
78s(b)(2)(C)(ii). In addition, the SEC may, on its own initiative, amend FINRA’s rules as it 
deems “necessary or appropriate . . . in furtherance of the purposes of [the Exchange Act].” 
Id. § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c). 
 
31 For example, in 2010 in the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress created the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) within the Federal Reserve System as an “independent 
regulatory agency tasked with ensuring that consumer debt products are safe and 
transparent.” Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2191 (2020); 
12 U. S. C. § 5511(a). Congress created the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970 “to 
consolidate the major environmental responsibilities of the federal government.” The 
Environmental Protection Agency, 5 West's Fed. Admin. Prac. § 5223. 
 
32 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (“Dodd-Frank”). 
 
33 See Dodd-Frank § 921(a) (empowering the SEC to prohibit mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses in customer agreements). 
 
34 See Jill I. Gross, The Historical Basis of Securities Arbitration as an Investor Protection 
Mechanism, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 171, 175-76 (describing history of development of the 
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Dealers (“NASD”) has been running a dispute resolution forum for 
arbitration and mediation of both customer and intra-industry disputes since 
1968.35  
 
A. FINRA Rule 13204 
 
Since 1992, FINRA, as a policy matter, has banned class action 
arbitration proceedings in its forum. Both Rule 12204(a) of the Customer 
Code and Rule 13204(a) of the Industry Code state: “(1) Class action claims 
may not be arbitrated under [FINRA Rules].”36 Additionally, subsection 
(a)(4) of the rules provide: 
 
A member or associated person may not enforce any 
arbitration agreement against a member of a certified or 
putative class action with respect to any claim that is the 
subject of the certified or putative class action until:  
 
• The class certification is denied;  
• The class is decertified;  
• The member of the certified or putative class is 
excluded from the class by the court; or  
• The member of the certified or putative class elects not 
to participate in the class or withdraws from the class 
according to conditions set by the court, if any.37   
 
SRO arbitration forum for the securities industry). 
 
35 Id. at 181. 
 
36 FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12204(a); FINRA Code 
of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes R. 13204(a); see also Lloyd v. J.P. Morgan 
Chase & Co., 791 F.3d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Rule 13204 prevents FINRA arbitrators 
from entertaining class and collective action claims”). However, FINRA recognizes that 
claimants may benefit by combining similar claims to achieve efficiencies and cost-savings. 
Thus, it permits joinder of claims if: (1) “the claims contain common questions of law or 
fact, and (2) the claims assert any right to relief jointly and severally, or the claims arise out 
of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.” FINRA Code 
of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes R. 12312(a); FINRA Code of Arbitration 
Procedure for Industry Disputes R. 13312(a). 
 
37 FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes R. 13204(a)(4). Prior to 1992, 
there were no express protections against member firms enforcing pre-dispute agreements to 
compel arbitration of class or putative class claims. Specifically, the SEC’s notice of the 
proposed new NASD rule stated that it was being proposed by the NASD following a request 






Rule 13204(b) proscribes the same limitations with respect to collective 
actions.38 Thus, the rule explicitly bars member firms from enforcing any 
arbitration agreement against an associated person (i.e., an employee) with 
respect to any class or collective action claim unless and until one of the four 
conditions are satisfied. Because a class waiver is one term of an arbitration 
agreement, the rule bars member firms from enforcing class waivers unless 
and until one of the four conditions are satisfied. 
The SEC’s order approving the predecessor to Rule 12204, NASD Rule 
10301,39 emphasized that the Commission made a policy choice that class 
actions did not belong in SRO arbitration: 
 
[T]he NASD believes, and the Commission agrees, that the 
judicial system has already developed the procedures to 
manage class action claims. Entertaining such claims through 
arbitration at the NASD would be difficult, duplicative and 
wasteful.…The Commission agrees with the NASD’s position 
that, in all cases, class actions are better handled by the courts 
and that investors should have access to the courts to resolve 
class actions efficiently.40 
 
that would give investors access to the courts in appropriate cases, including class actions.” 
See Proposed Rule Change by Nat’l Assoc. of Sec. Dealers, Inc. re Improvements in NASD 
Code of Arbitration Proc., 57 Fed. Reg. 30519-01, 30520 (July 1, 1992). 
 
38 FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes R. 13204(b). 
 
39 In 2007, NASD Rule 10301, as it related to employees, was administratively replaced by 
the substantively similar FINRA Rule 13204 following the merger of NASD and NYSE 
Regulation, Inc. to form FINRA. FINRA Regulatory Notice 07-07, Code of Arbitration 
Procedure (Apr. 16, 2007). As part of that code consolidation project, FINRA added one 
sentence to the end of new FINRA Rule 13204: “These subparagraphs do not otherwise 
affect the enforceability of any rights under the Code or any other agreement.” This sentence 
updated language in old NASD Rule 10301 that stated: “No member or associated person 
shall be deemed to have waived any of its rights under this Code or under any agreement to 
arbitrate to which it is party except to the extent stated in this paragraph.” Reorganization 
and Revision of NASD Arbitration Rules Relating to Industry Disputes, SR-NASD-2004-
011, https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rule-filings/sr-nasd-2004-011. FINRA has 
explained that “any other agreement” means an agreement other than the predispute 
arbitration agreement with a customer. Schwab, 2014 WL 1665738 at *22 n.11. If a class 
waiver clause is part of the arbitration agreement, then this sentence does not indicate that a 
class waiver is enforceable as “any other agreement.” 
40 Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc,;  
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to Exclusion of Class Action Claims  
from Arbitration, 57 Fed. Reg. 52659, 52660 (Nov. 4, 1992). 
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Thus, the SEC determined that courts were the preferable forum for class 
claims, because, unlike the SRO arbitration forums, courts already had in 
place procedures to manage those claims.41 In approving the rule, the SEC 
recognized that class actions were important for investor protection and 
reflected an efficient allocation of resources between two dispute resolution 
systems.42 Moreover,  the rule addressed the SEC’s concern that investors 
should have access to the courts in appropriate cases, including for class 
actions.43  
Two years later, in 1994, the SEC approved an amendment to NASD Rule 
10301 to clarify that the rule was intended to cover employment-related class 
actions involving member firms and their employees, and not just customer 
class actions.44 Notably, in approving this clarifying change, the SEC 
reiterated the rule’s fundamental purpose of protecting member firms’ 
customers and employees’ rights to bring and participate in class actions:  
“[The SEC] believes that access to the courts for class action litigation should 
be preserved for associated persons and member firms as well as for investors 
and that the rule change approved herein provides a sound procedure for the 
management of class actions.”45  
In 2012, the SEC approved an amendment to FINRA Rule 13204 (former 
 
41 “The NASD believes that the proposed rule change … will facilitate the arbitration process 
for all participants by preventing certain categories of actions from being brought in the 
NASD's arbitration forum and for which the forum does not have procedures or resources to 
handle.” Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by 
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Exclusion of Class Action 
Claims from Arbitration, Release No. 33506, 1994 WL 28348, at *2 (Jan. 24, 1993). 
 
42 Id. For a more complete history of the rule, see Barbara Black and Jill I. Gross, Investor 
Protection Meets the Federal Arbitration Act, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 1, 27-28 (2012). 
 
43 Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.;  
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Exclusion of Class Actions From 
Arbitration Proceedings, 57 Fed. Reg. 52659-02, at 52660; see also Dep’t of Enforcement v. 
Charles Schwab & Co., No. 2011029760201, 2014 WL 1665738, *11 (FINRA Bd. of 
Governors Apr. 24, 2014) (“Rule 12204 of the Customer Code was intended to preserve 
investor access to the courts to bring or participate in judicial class actions”).  
 
44 Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc,;  
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to Exclusion of Class Action Claims  
from Arbitration, 59 Fed. Reg. 22032-01, at 22033 (explaining that the “original intent of the 
[1992 rule] was to exclude class action claims by associated persons, including employment-
related claims, and other industry class actions from arbitration, as well as customer-related 
class actions.”). 





NASD Rule 10301), creating new subsection (b) to expand the Rule’s 
prohibition to “collective action claims by employees of FINRA members 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), or the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (APA).”46 In its 
approval order, the SEC reiterated that one of the fundamental purposes of 
Rule 13204 is to protect member firms’ employees’ rights to bring and 
participate in class and collective actions in court.47 The SEC specifically 
based its approval on, inter alia, its findings that the amendment would:  
(a) “facilitate the efficient resolution of collective actions under the FLSA, 
ADEA, or the EPA, as courts have established procedures to manage these 
types of representative actions;” and (b) “preserve access to courts for these 
types of claims for employees of FINRA members.”48  
In summary, while there have been a few amendments to the language of 
Rules 12204 and 13204 over the years, the basic restrictions of the current 
version are materially the same as those of the original rule the SEC approved 
back in 1992—member firms may not enforce pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements with respect to class or putative class claims, subject to four listed 
exceptions addressing situations such as where class certification has been 
denied or where an absent class member has affirmatively opted out of a class 
pursuant to Rule 23 or similar state procedures.   
 
B. FINRA Rule 12204 Bars Class Action Waivers in Customer 
Agreements 
 
FINRA Rule 12204(d)—worded substantially similar to Rule 
13204(a)(4)—is the counterpart to Rule 13204 in the customer context. 
 
46 Self-Regulatory Organizations; Financial Industry Regulatory Authoritym Inc.; Notice of 
filing Amendment No. 1 and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of a Proposed Rule 
Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 1, Amending Rule 13204 of the Code of Arbitration 
Procedure for Industry Disputes to Preclude Collective Action Claims From Being 
Arbitrated, 77 Fed. Reg. 22374 (Apr. 13, 2012). 
 
47 Id. at 22375. During the comment period, Assistant Chief Counsel of FINRA Dispute 
Resolution, Mignon McLemore, noted in a letter to the SEC that “any language in a member 
firm’s employment agreement that requires employees to waive their right to file or 
participate in a collective action against a member firm in other fora is contrary to the 
provisions of the Industry Code. A member firm's use of such language that limits 
employees’ rights, and contradicts Rule 13204(b), would violate IM-13000, and may also 
violate FINRA Rule 2010.” Letter from Mignon McLemore, Assistant Chief Counsel, 
FINRA Dispute Resolution, to Elizabeth Murphy, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Apr. 13, 2012, https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-finra-2011-
075/finra2011075-4.pdf (last visited July 3, 2020). 
 
48 SEC Order re Amending Rule 13204, 77 Fed. Reg. at 22375. 
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Significantly, FINRA has interpreted Rule 12204(d) to bar class action 
waivers in arbitration agreements between broker-dealers and their 
customers. In 2014, in an enforcement action against FINRA member Charles 
Schwab, the FINRA Board of Governors ruled that Schwab’s inclusion of a 
class waiver provision in its customer arbitration agreement violated FINRA 
Rule 12204(d).49  
  
IV. THE “CONTRARY CONGRESSIONAL COMMAND” 
EXCEPTION TO THE FAA 
 
As stated above, under the FAA, courts must enforce arbitration 
agreements as written.50 However, the Court has declared repeatedly that the 
FAA’s mandate is not absolute: it “may be overridden by a contrary 
Congressional command.”51 Indeed, in any statutory context, when 
inconsistent laws emanate from a single legislature, absent an express 
exemption clause in either, the Supreme Court reconciles them by applying 
the long-standing canon of statutory construction known as the implied repeal 
doctrine.52 Limited to narrow circumstances,53 the doctrine applies only to 
the extent necessary to reconcile the conflicting laws.54 The burden is on the 
party seeking the implied repeal to show congressional intent to override the 
former law, which can be proven through (1) the text of the law, (2) its 
legislative history, or (3) an inherent conflict between the edict of the former 
law and the underlying purpose of the latter.55 
 
49 Dep’t of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co., No. 2011029760201, 2014 WL 1665738 
(FINRA Bd. of Governors Apr. 24, 2014). 
 
50 See supra notes 4-5, and accompanying text. 
 
51 Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226-27 (1987); see also CompuCredit 
Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012). 
 
52 For a more thorough description of the implied repeal doctrine, see Black and Gross, supra 
note 42, at 32-35. 
 
53 See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 734 (1975) (implied 
repeal limited to “particular and discrete instances” where an appeal was “necessary to make 
the [regulatory scheme] work”) (alteration in original) (quoting Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 
373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)). 
 
54 See Silver, 373 U.S. at 357; Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003). 
55 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226-27 (analyzing alleged conflict between FAA and the anti-
waiver section of the Exchange Act); see also Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, 
551 U.S. 264, 275-77 (2007) (identifying factors to consider when choosing between 





The Supreme Court recently considered the implied repeal doctrine when 
analyzing an alleged conflict between the FAA and another Congressional 
statute.56 In Epic Systems, employees alleged various labor and law violations 
by their employers in class actions filed in federal district court. The 
employers sought to compel arbitration pursuant to a pre-dispute arbitration 
clause and class action waiver in the applicable employment agreements. The 
employees argued that the National Labor Relations Act’s (“NLRA”) 
protection of “concerted activities”57 included an employee’s right to pursue 
labor claims as a class or collective action and thus displaced the FAA’s 
mandate to enforce arbitration agreements as written. 
The Court rejected plaintiffs’ contention that section 7 of the NLRA 
conflicts with section 2 of the FAA: 
 
When confronted with two Acts of Congress allegedly touching on 
the same topic, this Court is not at “liberty to pick and choose among 
congressional enactments” and must instead strive “‘to give effect to 
both.’” A party seeking to suggest that two statutes cannot be harmonized, 
and that one displaces the other, bears the heavy burden of showing “‘a 
clearly expressed congressional intention’” that such a result should 
follow. The intention must be “‘clear and manifest.’” And in approaching 
a claimed conflict, we come armed with the “stron[g] presum[ption]” that 
repeals by implication are “disfavored” and that “Congress will 
specifically address” preexisting law when it wishes to suspend its normal 
operations in a later statute.58 
 
The Court held that Section 7 of the NLRA is not a “contrary” 
pronouncement by Congress that supplanted the FAA because it does not 
express approval or disapproval of arbitration or mention class procedures.59 
Rather, section 7 speaks only about workers’ concerted activities such as 
collective bargaining, picketing and strikes. Indeed, the Court stated “that the 
absence of any specific statutory discussion of arbitration or class actions is 
 
56 Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624-30 (2018) (identifying criteria for 
application of implied repeal doctrine). 
 
57 29 U. S. C. §157. 
 
58 Epic Sys. Corp.,138 S. Ct. at 1624 (internal citations omitted). 
 
59 Id. at 1624. The Court declined to give deference to the National Labor Relations Board’s 
interpretation of the NLRA that it voided class action waivers because the Court did not 
agree with the proposition that “Congress implicitly delegated to an agency authority to 
address the meaning of a second statute it does not administer.” Id. at 1629. 
 
   
 109 
an important and telling clue that Congress has not displaced the Arbitration 
Act.”60  
Very few courts have examined whether FINRA Rule 13204 bars broker-
dealers from enforcing class action waivers in their agreements with 
employees under the implied repeal doctrine.61 One circuit court decision on 
point is Cohen v. UBS Financial Services, Inc.62 In Cohen, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals enforced a class action waiver in an employment agreement 
between Cohen, a FINRA “associated person,” and UBS Securities (“UBS”), 
a broker-dealer. Cohen had filed a putative class and collective action against 
UBS, asserting wage-and-hour claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
and California law. UBS moved to compel individual arbitration, invoking 
an arbitration clause and class and collective action waiver in the parties’ 
employment agreement.63  
Cohen argued that FINRA Rule 13204 barred the enforcement of the class 
action waiver, because it was a “contrary congressional command” that 
superseded the FAA.64 Cohen contended that Rule 13204 prohibited broker-
dealers from forcing employees to waive their rights to bring a collective or 
class action, contrary to the FAA’s general pronouncement to enforce 
arbitration agreements as written.65 The Second Circuit rejected that 
argument, finding no conflict between the Rule and the FAA. Rather, the 
Second Circuit concluded that Rule 13204 “does not preserve the right to 
assert a claim in class or collective form notwithstanding a contractual 
waiver.”66 The Court wrote: 
 
Cohen conflates an agreement to arbitrate with a waiver of the right to 
assert claims in class or collective form. Subsections (a)(4) and (b)(4) [of 
Rule 13204] bar the enforcement of arbitration agreements under certain 
circumstances; but neither subsection has anything to say about the 
 
60 Id. at 1627.   
 
61 One court of appeals held that an arbitrator should resolve the conflict between a class 
waiver in an employment agreement and Rule 13204. See Hendricks v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 
546 F. App'x 514, 519 (5th Cir. 2013) (“we leave for the FINRA arbitration panel to decide 
whether the class waiver requires the Plaintiffs to arbitrate on an individual basis”). 
 
62 799 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 




65 Id. at 178. 





enforceability of the waivers. Although such waivers are often found in 
arbitration agreements (and are so incorporated in this case), the two 
contract terms are conceptually distinct. A class or collective action 
waiver is a promise to forgo certain procedural mechanisms in court. An 
agreement to arbitrate, on the other hand, is a promise to have a dispute 
heard in some forum other than a court. Rule 13204 restricts the latter, 
but not the former. As the FINRA Board of Governors has observed, 
“there are no restrictions upon firms regarding the content of predispute 
arbitration agreements with employees.”67 
 
 In sum, the Second Circuit concluded that Rule 13204 is not 
“contrary” to the FAA because “it does not prohibit a pre-dispute waiver of 
class and collective action procedures, and permits FINRA arbitration of 
individual wage-and-hour claims.”68 Absent any conflict, the court reasoned, 
both rules can co-exist, and the court need not even reach the issue of whether 
Rule 13204 is a “congressional command.69  
 One year after Cohen, FINRA publicly and forcefully indicated it did 
not agree with Cohen’s interpretation of FINRA rules. In Regulatory Notice 
16-25, FINRA stated that the language from Schwab that the Cohen court 
cited was “dicta” as well as “superseded” by the Notice.70  
 As detailed in Part V below, like FINRA, this author believes that 
Cohen and Laver were wrongly decided. 
 
67 Id. at 179–80 (citing In re Dep't of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co., No. 
2011029760201, 2014 WL 1665738, at *8 (FINRA Bd. of Governors Apr. 24, 2014)).  
 
68 Cohen, 799 F.3d at 178. 
 
69 Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals very recently agreed with the ruling in Cohen. See 
Laver v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA), LLC, 976 F.3d 841, 847 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that Rule 
13204 is not contrary to Credit Suisse’s arbitration agreement because it does not ban class 
action waivers “with the clarity necessary” to displace the FAA and thus enforcing class 
action waiver in brokers’ employment contracts). 
 
70 FINRA Regulatory Notice 16-25, Forum Selection Provisions Involving Customers, 
Associated Persons and Member Firms, 2016 WL 4060371, at *6 n.23 (July 2016). Courts 
are divided as to whether Regulatory Notice 16-25 prohibits courts from enforcing waivers 
of the right to arbitration under FINRA Rules in broker-dealer agreements. Compare   
New York Bay Capital, LLC v. Cobalt Holdings, Inc., No. 1:19-CV-3618-GHW, 2020 WL 
1989485, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2020) (holding that Regulatory Notice 16-25 does not 
change the law that a forum selection clause supersedes FINRA Rule 12200); Binkele v. 
Ausloos, No. 219CV01079APGVCF, 2019 WL 7597041, at *2 n.1 (D. Nev. July 16, 2019) 
(“FINRA has no authority over federal courts in this regard”) with Reading Health Sys. v. 
Bear Stearns & Co. 900 F. 3d 87 (3d Cir 2018) (citing Regulatory Notice 16-25 to support 
its conclusion that forum selection clause did not supersede FINRA Rule 12200). 
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V. THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, THROUGH 
FINRA RULE 13204, DISPLACES THE FAA 
 
This section argues that courts cannot enforce a class waiver in an 
employee’s arbitration agreement with a FINRA member firm (a broker-
dealer) because FINRA Rule 13204 (approved by the SEC through its 
Congressionally-delegated authority) is a “contrary congressional command” 
that displaces the FAA’s command to enforce arbitration agreements as 
written.  
 
A. Rule 13204 is “Contrary” to FAA section 2 
 
Rule 13204 bars class/collective actions from FINRA’s arbitration 
forum.71 Rule 13204 also bars broker-dealers from enforcing a class waiver 
in their employment agreements. Indeed, they would face disciplinary action 
if they did so.72  
Therefore, Rule 13204 conflicts with the FAA because a court cannot 
simultaneously respect the Rule’s prohibition on class action waivers in 
broker-dealers’ arbitration agreements with their employees and the FAA’s 
mandate to enforce arbitration agreements as written. Any other reading 
would subvert the Rule’s purpose by enforcing class waiver provisions that 
are within the very arbitration clauses that the Rule’s express language render 
unenforceable in this context. Moreover, the “legislative” history of Rule 
13204(a)(4) makes clear that the Rule was designed to protect and preserve 
FINRA member firm employees’ access to the courts for putative class 
actions against their member employees.73  
Unlike Section 7 of the NLRA at issue in Epic Systems, the FINRA rule 
at issue—adopted in 1992—explicitly addresses arbitration for disputes 
between FINRA member firms and their associated persons, and it also 
explicitly addresses class procedures. Moreover, several of FINRA’s findings 
in Schwab are pertinent to the interpretation of Rule 13204(a)(4). In 
particular, the Board of Governors wrote: 
 
71 Courts grant the SEC deference in determining the meaning of SRO rules. Milliner v. Mut. 
Sec., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 3d 1060, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
 
72 FINRA IM 13000 (“[i]t may be deemed conduct inconsistent with just and equitable 
principles of trade and a violation of Rule 2010 for a member to require an associated person 
to waive the arbitration of disputes contrary to the provisions of the Code of Arbitration 
Procedure…”). 
 






Rule 12204(d) of the Customer Code by its terms prevents a firm from 
enforcing a predispute arbitration agreement until a court disposes of the 
class action allegations or the customer opts out of the putative or certified 
class. Thus, none of the exceptions listed in subsection (d) apply until a 
customer is given the opportunity to participate in a class action. It 
therefore stands to reason that Rule 12204 of the Customer Code does 
not contemplate a prospective waiver of a customer’s right to participate 
in a class action.”74 
 
The Schwab reasoning that Rule 12204 prohibits class action waivers in 
broker-dealer/customer arbitration agreements applies with equal force to 
Rule 13204(a)(4) with respect to broker-dealer/employment agreements. 
Rules 13204 and 12204 share the same history. In both the 1992 and 1994 
approval orders for the relevant rules, the SEC emphasized that these rules 
promote the important interest that “access to the courts for class action 
litigation should be preserved.”75  
In addition, the Cohen and Laver courts incorrectly ruled that there is no 
conflict between Rule 13204 and FAA section 2. In particular, both courts 
erred when they treated the agreement to arbitrate as “conceptually distinct” 
from the class waiver.76 First, if the two provisions are distinct, then one is 
certainly not an agreement to arbitrate and thus not covered by FAA section 
2. Second, and importantly, the Supreme Court in Italian Colors said an 
agreement to arbitrate and a class action waiver should be read together as 
part of one agreement.77 When read together as one agreement, Rule 13204 
does conflict with FAA section 2, because enforcing one necessarily requires 
ignoring the other. If the agreement including the class waiver is enforceable 
as written, a broker-dealer employee would not be able to invoke FINRA 
 
74 Schwab, 2014 WL 1665738 at *8 (first emphasis original; second emphasis added). 
 
75 SEC Order re Exclusion of Class Actions from Arbitration, 57 Fed. Reg. 52659-02, at 
52661; SEC Order re Exclusion of Class Action Claims from Arbitration, 59 Fed. Reg. 
22032-01, at 22033. As the court in Cohen noted, the FINRA Board of Governors in Schwab 
also mentioned three district court cases that had been cited by Schwab there, each of which 
had found class waivers enforceable in the context of employment claims.  FINRA stated 
that these cases were not “controlling over disputes with customers.”  However, contrary to 
what the Second Circuit seems to have implied in Cohen, FINRA did not say either way in 
Schwab, neither did it have opportunity to decide, whether those district court cases were 
correctly decided or consistent with FINRA Rule 13204(a)(4).  Schwab, 2014 WL 1665738, 
at *7-8. 
76 Cohen, 799 F.3d at 179-80; Laver, 976 F.3d at 847. 
 
77 See supra note 8. 
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Rule 13204 which bars FINRA member firms from enforcing clauses in 
arbitration agreements that purport to waive their associated persons’ rights 
to pursue class claims in court.  
 
B. Rule 13204 is a “Congressional Command”  
 
In addition, Rule 13204 is a “command” of Congress sufficient to 
displace the FAA. In Cohen and Laver, the Second and Ninth Circuits did not 
reach the issue of whether a FINRA rule could displace another Act of 
Congress. The few lower courts to consider it have divided on the question.78  
First, it is indisputable that FINRA member firms must abide by all 
FINRA rules, including the Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry 
Disputes.79 Furthermore, FINRA Rules “approved by the SEC are 
expressions of federal legislative power.”80 Therefore, Rule 13204 has the 
force of federal law, i.e. ’34 Act, under Exchange Act §15A.81  
Second, an administrative agency pronouncement can be a “command” 
for purposes of the implied repeal doctrine. The Supreme Court itself cited a 
Congressional delegation of authority to an administrative agency to regulate 
arbitration—precisely what we have here—as an example of a “contrary 
 
78 Compare Singh v. Interactive Brokers LLC, 2016 WL 7007791 (E.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2016) 
(holding that arbitration rules of FINRA are not contrary “Congressional” commands), with 
Dep't of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., Complaint No. 2011029760201, 2014 
WL 1665738 (FINRA Apr. 24, 2014) (reasoning that, because the Exchange Act delegated 
to the SEC, which in turn delegated to FINRA, the authority to regulate broker-dealers’ 
arbitration agreements for the protection of investors, the Exchange Act, through FINRA 
Rule 12204, constituted a sufficient Congressional command to overcome the FAA's 
mandate). 
 
79 See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Tracy, 812 F.3d 249, 253 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Nor is 
there any dispute that, as a member of FINRA, Credit Suisse is bound to follow FINRA's 
arbitration rules. Arbitration rules, as we have previously concluded, bind FINRA members. 
. .”); Reading Health Sys. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 900 F.3d 87, 93 (3d Cir. 2018) (same). 
80 Charles Schwab & Co. Inc. v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. Inc., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 
1065 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citations omitted) (“Because of the SEC's 
oversight, FINRA Rules approved by the SEC are expressions of federal legislative power 
and have the force and effect of a federal regulation.”).  
 
81 See McDaniel v. Wells Fargo Invs., LLC, 717 F.3d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Congress has 
vested [FINRA] and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) with the power to promulgate 
rules that, once adopted by the SEC, have the force of law”); Credit Suisse First Boston 
Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1132 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding SRO arbitration rules 






congressional command” for purposes of supplanting the FAA.82 In 
CompuCredit, when rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that the Credit Repair 
Organizations Act (CROA)—which made no mention of arbitration—
superseded the FAA, the Court stated:  
 
Had Congress meant to prohibit these very common 
provisions [pre-dispute arbitration clauses] in the CROA, it 
would have done so in a manner less obtuse than what 
respondents suggest. When it has restricted the use of 
arbitration in other contexts, it has done so with a clarity that 
far exceeds the claimed indications in the CROA.83  
 
The Court then cited examples of statutes where Congress did speak with 
the requisite clarity. Included in those examples (with a cf. signal) was 12 
U.S.C. § 5518(b), the very statute that grants authority to the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) to regulate predispute arbitration 
agreements in contracts for consumer financial products or services.84 
Notably, that statute does not directly prohibit arbitration agreements or class 
waivers, it just empowers another governmental body to apply its own 
expertise to regulate arbitration as it sees fit. Thus, the Supreme Court pointed 
to a general Congressional delegation of authority to an administrative 
agency (there, the CFPB) to regulate arbitration in an industry (there, 
consumer financial services) in which the agency has special expertise, as a 
type of “congressional command” that could displace the FAA.85  
Congress has delegated to the SEC the authority to approve, amend or 
abrogate any rule of any securities self-regulatory organization (“SRO”), 
including FINRA.86 In addition, the delegation of authority explicitly covers 
activities of associated persons, not just activities of investors or customers.87 
 
82 See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 104 (2012). 
 
83 Id. at 103. 
 
84 Id. at 104. 
85 This does not mean that courts must accord formal deference to the SEC’s interpretation 
of FINRA’s rules, but courts should take into account that interpretation.  
 
86 See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233-34 (1987) 
(discussing Congress’ broad delegation to the SEC of “expansive power to ensure the 
adequacy of the arbitration procedures employed by the SROs”). 
 
87 See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Tracy, 812 F.3d 249, 253 (2d Cir. 2016) (“FINRA is 
an independent organization authorized by Congress to regulate the U.S. securities markets 
and professionals who sell securities in the United States”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) 
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The Supreme Court has long recognized that the 1975 amendments to the 
Exchange Act have multiple policy purposes, as they “authorize [FINRA] to 
promulgate rules designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative practices; 
to promote equitable principles of trade; to safeguard against unreasonable 
profits and charges; and generally to protect investors and the public 
interest.”88 Providing and regulating a forum for arbitration of industry 
disputes is just one way to achieve these broad Congressional goals. 
When approving FINRA Rule 13204, the SEC was implementing its 
Congressionally-delegated authority. And unlike in Epic Systems where the 
NLRA does not use term “class action,” Rule 13204 explicitly addresses class 
actions. Thus, Rule 13204 is a Congressional command within the meaning 
of CompuCredit that supplants the FAA’s general command to enforce 




 The Supreme Court no doubt enforces arbitration agreements under 
the FAA. In the last decade, the Court has extended that enforcement to class 
action waivers that are coupled with arbitration agreements. And, the 
Supreme Court has not met a class action waiver it has not liked.  
 Whether the Court will like a class action waiver in a broker-dealer’s 
agreement with its employees remains to be seen. Congress has delegated 
regulation of the securities industry to the SEC, which as a matter of policy 
has decided that class actions belong in court, not in arbitration. And, the SEC 
approved arbitration rules to ensure that investors and employees of broker-
dealers retain the ability to pursue their class claims in court.  
 A class action waiver, in essence, nullifies Rule 13204 entirely. To 
ignore Rule 13204’s prohibition of class action waivers would be to nullify 
the very regulation that the SEC approved. A FINRA member firm can evade 
the prohibition in Rule 13204(a)(4) by simply inserting a class action waiver 
in its standard arbitration agreement with employees. Just as Schwab’s effort 
to insert a class action waiver in customer agreements was shut down by 
FINRA in 2014, broker-dealers’ insertion of class action waivers in 
employment agreements should similary be shut down. 
 
(reflecting Congressional creation of a national securities association and regulations of 
persons associated with such association); 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g) (specifying the laws 
empowering the SEC to approve SRO rules includes rules governing persons associated with 
a member firm). 
 





 Permitting broker-dealers to evade the SEC’s regulations could lead 
to broader noncompliance in other areas of the securities laws. Congress 
created the SEC to be the expert regulator in the securities industry, and that 
agency has done so effectively for almost one hundred years. To eviscerate 
its powers now would cause disruption in the securities markets, hurt 
securities industry employees, and ultimately harm investors. 
